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The Rhetorical Phronimos: Political Wisdom 
in Postmodernity
M. Lane Bruner
Where is wisdom to be found in the political realm? Where is the wisdom 
to aid us in the never ending struggle to achieve the fullest human good within 
the uncertain, unpredictable, compelling, and oftentimes unjust realm of human 
action? Throughout history the answers have remained elusive. The incessant 
search for wisdom among his fellow citizens in ancient Athens led Socrates to 
a cup of poison for “corrupting the youth” and “denying the gods.”1  Across the 
ages, those who would dare to question political authority have been consistently 
imprisoned or publicly put to death, oftentimes with great fanfare. The history 
of what passes for statecraft has been a history of governments undermining the 
power of critical citizens and of wars waged between parties equally convinced of 
the virtuousness of their characters, the rightness of their causes, and the wisdom 
of their rulers. With its almost ceaseless violence and warfare, political history sug-
gests that humans simply lack political wisdom.  
And today, if we thought there might still be political wisdom somewhere, 
where would we go to look for it?  Could we turn to our personal character, our 
religious faith, or our confidence in our way of life?  Could we look for political 
wisdom in the ways our communities imagine themselves ethnically, culturally, 
and economically, or in the discourses that dominate the construction of those 
conceptions, or in the institutions that follow from those conceptions?  If hard 
pressed to go out into the world and find political wisdom, where would we go 
and to whom could we turn?  Surely we could not turn to our scientists with their 
“objective” forms of inquiry (“I only help design the computer technology that 
guides the bombs; I don’t decide when to drop them.”), or to technically profi-
cient professionals who stay focused on the object of their particular professions 
rather than the human consequences of their techniques.  Surely we could not 
turn to the managers of the self-interested organizations in which we work (“I 
am only responsible for the company’s bottom line and the profitability of bomb 
making, not the social effects of our profit taking or of the bombs themselves.”), 
where resources are always distributed according to prevailing discourses of power 
that seek to take more than they give, that constrain open deliberative processes, 
and where organizational goals “rationally” take precedence over social reason. 
And surely we could not turn to our self-interested governments in the explosive 
conditions of the “new world order,” with its increasingly stark contrasts between 
the rich and the poor, its increasingly terrible military technologies, and its ethno-
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cultural and religious hatreds (“Let’s use the bomb!”).
Not only does the search for political wisdom in history prove relatively futile, 
previously influential notions of political wisdom such as Aristotle’s concept of 
phronesis (roughly translated today as either prudence or practical wisdom) have 
been made increasingly suspect by centuries of philosophical debate over the 
possibility of human rationality.2  The hallmark of Cartesian rationalism was the 
assumption that the same degree of certainty could be attained in the social sci-
ences as well as the physical sciences.3   Subsequently, political philosophers from 
Immanuel Kant to John Dewey to Jürgen Habermas have fought for the idea that 
every mature individual, given the right conditions, was capable of productively 
critiquing government (arguing that widespread political wisdom was both neces-
sary and possible).4   However, social and political philosophers over the last two 
centuries, like astronomers over the last millennium, have worked to “de-center” 
the rational subject, making the notion of political wisdom increasingly problem-
atic. In astronomy, Ptolemy theorized that the earth was the center of the universe, 
just as Enlightenment philosophers theorized that humans could rationally and 
objectively govern the world. Copernicus next theorized that the earth revolved 
around the sun and was influenced by previously unrecognized forces, just as mod-
ernism ushered in an era of philosophy focused on how the “rational” subject 
was influenced by outside forces beyond their control (the psyche, the economy, 
the metaphorical nature of identity, etc.).  Einstein then devised his theory of 
relativity, and postmodern philosophers left the fully rational, autonomous, and 
“centered” political individual for good, maintaining that humans, lost in violent 
fields of absence and difference, are compelled to maneuver through endless mazes 
of politically consequential language games, disciplinary practices, and patterns 
of subjection. The intellectual leaders of both modernism and postmodernism, 
in sum, have shown in a variety of ways that humans are irrational at their core, 
so what possible hope can there be for political wisdom and/or responsible state-
craft? 
Phronesis, therefore, although it is one of our few available conceptual resources 
for reconsidering the possibility of political wisdom in contemporary circum-
stances, is highly suspect. Not only does it predate the philosophical movement 
from modernity to modernism to postmodernism, it is a term centrally concerned 
with intentionality, virtuous character, and moral confidence (i.e. through wise 
deliberation, civic and personal virtue, and a keen sense of justice, individuals 
take intentional action in uncertain but compelling circumstances to maximize 
the virtue of citizens and states and to achieve the common good). It is a concept 
that appears to fly in the face of the contemporary philosophical conclusion that 
rational individuals, as political animals, simply do not exist. Despite this apparent 
conclusion, however, in this short essay I would like to revisit Aristotle’s notion 
of phronesis as a thought experiment, carefully separating, as did Aristotle, the 
“rational” (theoretical wisdom) from the “reasonable” (practical wisdom). After 
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briefly tracing some of the post-Cartesian attacks on the rational subject, review-
ing Aristotle’s notion of phronesis, and re-considering two contemporary debates 
in critical and political theory, perhaps it will be possible to overcome key objec-
tions and articulate a practical and theoretical conception of “postmodern” politi-
cal wisdom. 
“Rational” Citizens and Their Political Realms
In 17th and18th century Europe and the United States, social and political 
philosophers such as John Locke, Jeremy Bentham, Immanuel Kant and Thomas 
Paine had a great deal of faith in the power of the rational public. Publics com-
posed of autonomous individuals were thought to have the potential to check 
arbitrary state power through rational deliberation. Contemporary critics, how-
ever, could point out that many of the ideas prevalent in political theory at that 
time were “productive fictions” emerging with, and strengthened by, colonial-
capitalism. Notions such as sovereignty, self-determination, free trade, the public, 
individuality and objectivity were related to notions of freedom ideologically ame-
liorating the painful disruptions in local (usually illiterate) community caused by 
urbanization and the expansion of market economies. In other words, there were 
ideological underpinnings behind Enlightenment political philosophy, oftentimes 
making it more “symptomatic” than “realistic.”5 
Subsequently, both modern and postmodern thinkers have reminded us of the 
numerous obstacles facing citizens who through their supposed rationality are to 
deliberate and rule wisely. Karl Marx, for example, undermined the notion of the 
fully free, objective, and rational individual by explaining how economic relations 
profoundly influence individual and social identities.6  Sigmund Freud argued that 
unconscious impulses direct our patterns of daily actions and interactions and that 
society itself is based upon modes of repression.7   Friedrich Nietzsche undermined 
the notions of rationality and objectivity by arguing that all of our language, and 
therefore our very apprehension of the world, is fundamentally metaphorical and 
that our poetic constructions, taken as concrete truths, directly impact our indi-
vidual and social conditions.8   Ferdinand de Saussure argued that identity itself was 
based on difference in his work on linguistics,9  and continental philosophers such 
as Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and Hans-Georg Gadamer extended these 
insights into various branches of critical theory. Foucault, for example, argued that 
identity/subjectivity unwittingly disciplines and necessarily establishes variously 
enabling constraints.10  Derrida maintains that all attempts at moral closure and 
identity are doomed to shipwreck on the narrative absences and exclusions such 
closures and identities require.11  And Gadamer has persuasively argued that mean-
ing/subjectivity is always a “fusion of horizons” and that identity is not simply 
controlled by the interpreter but is always an encounter with an unexpected and 
ultimately unknowable Other.12   Each thinker, in his own way, has pointed out how 
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human beings are not as rational and objective as they might have once believed.
While such examples only scratch the surface of critiques that have been lev-
eled against the rational individual, contemporary critics could rightfully maintain 
that to speak of “character” or “virtue” or “wisdom” today as a stable set of beliefs, 
characteristics, or deliberative practices designed to compel “right action” for the 
“common good” requires considerable qualification to remain philosophically 
informed. In light of these and other insights into human subjectivity, “strong 
positions” appear motivated by so many unintentional factors and irrational forces 
that moral certainty in the political realm is simply irresponsible, unless those 
“positions” are of a highly refined and reflexive type usually not found in the 
political realm.13
Not only are individuals generally incapable of being politically rational, they 
also experience “the political” on a variety of oftentimes mutually incompatible 
levels. The contemporary theorist of political wisdom, therefore, must both be 
philosophically informed about the wide range of constraints on rationality as well 
as with the range of political realms in which processes of identification (one of 
the main subjects of modern and postmodern political theory) take place.14  Here, 
perhaps surprisingly, is where a review of Aristotle’s notion of phronesis first proves 
useful, for he is generally believed to be the first to have systematically conceptual-
ized four interactive “layers” to the political realm in which political wisdom was 
active: the realms of self-interest, family relations, legislation, and statesmanship.15 
In the “market democracies” of today, for example, there is a unique political ter-
rain that involves self-interest (e.g. corporations as legal “individuals,” economic 
liberalism/market ethics, radical individualism), family relations (the general break-
down of the extended family into a considerably weakened “nuclear” family under 
the ideological haze of “family values” discourse), legislation (a general disman-
tling of the New Deal in the United States and the “welfare state” worldwide, and 
a simultaneous trend toward un-elected supra-national governance through trade 
and finance agreements), and deliberative and judicial procedures (the simultane-
ous expansion of the nation state system and the decline of the real political power 
of individual states, the decline of representative democracy, the rise of executive 
authority, and the rise of transnational court systems). Any contemporary char-
acterization and enactment of phronesis would, at least according to Aristotle’s 
conception, have to take such “layers” and their interactions into account.
But is a workable revision of phronesis even possible in our postmodern and 
post-essentialist age, where anyone absolutely certain (the True Believer) in the 
quasi-metaphorical realm of human affairs is viewed as philosophically naïve, if 
not downright dangerous?  Socrates willingly drank the poison, because, guided as 
he was by the “voice” (of conscience?) that would come to him, he believed it was 
the practically wise thing to do, concerned as he was with educating the Athenian 
citizens to the virtue of incessant self-criticism.16  But is Socrates’ behavior, which 
was pre-Aristotelian, perhaps anti-democratic, and situated in a slave-holding and 
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misogynist culture, or Aristotle’s theory, obviously ignorant of the insights of mod-
ernism and contemporary identity theory, adequate models for political wisdom 
in post-modernity? In what follows, I respond to these questions and argue that it 
is indeed possible for a contemporary form of phronesis to exist in our post-ratio-
nal age both in theory and practice. If Aristotle’s definition of phronesis as wise 
deliberation applied to virtuous character in action (where the ultimate form of 
practical wisdom is “statesmanship” in the realms of self-interest, family, legisla-
tion, and deliberative/judicial procedure) remains at all useful, then perhaps it will 
prove beneficial to review that definition and then to reconsider phronesis through 
the lens of contemporary philosophical and political debates. 
Aristotle’s Theory of Knowledge
To initiate a discussion on the possibility of a coherent contemporary concep-
tion of phronesis, it is helpful to understand Aristotle’s own definition of the term 
and how it differs from his definitions of other forms of knowledge. Once phro-
nesis is defined we can move on to an explanation of the role of rhetoric within 
Aristotle’s epistemology, how identity philosophy relates to the rhetorical arts, 
and how recent debates in critical and political theory impact Aristotle’s theory of 
political wisdom.  At that point a rudimentary characterization of what postmod-
ern political wisdom might look like can be offered.
In all, and as is relatively well known, Aristotle identified five “means of judg-
ment”: intelligence (nous and dianoia), scientific knowledge (episteme), art (techne), 
theoretical wisdom (sophia), and practical wisdom (phronesis).17  Intelligence basi-
cally refers to the human capacity to apprehend the material world (sense percep-
tion and conceptualization), scientific knowledge concerns the relatively certain 
forms of knowledge associated with physical and mathematical laws, and art is 
concerned with the knowledge that comes from the mastery of a skill or profes-
sion. But the means of judgment of special interest here is not to be found in 
either the sciences or the professions, for the arts and sciences each have their 
own particular ends while phronesis is only concerned with what brings about 
the greatest human good. Furthermore, while the arts and sciences have relative 
certainty within the realm of their own disciplinary practices, negotiating among 
those practices requires another type of knowledge altogether: wisdom. 
As noted, within Aristotle’s epistemology, there are two distinct forms of 
wisdom: theoretical wisdom (sophia) and practical wisdom (phronesis). Theoretical 
wisdom deals with metaphysics, philosophy, theology and universal truths, and 
though “it is the highest form” of knowledge, according to Aristotle, practical 
wisdom has “greater authority” because of its concern with the concrete day to day 
affairs of human beings in action.18   Practical wisdom deals with ethics (actions 
which result in a virtuous life) and politics (actions which result in a well-ordered 
state), and is principally concerned with wise deliberation, right action, and virtu-
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ous character.19   It is, in Eugene Garver’s words, “the ability to confront the per-
manent possibility of instability,” for in the realm of practical wisdom there are no 
certainties, only probabilities. 20 
While the ancient Greek philosopher Heraclitus purportedly claimed that, 
“To be wise is one thing: to know the thought that directs all things through all 
things,”21  he also noted that “the Logos proves incomprehensible, for although all 
things happen according to the Logos, many act as if they have no experience of 
it.”22   Following his distinction, there would need to be two forms of wisdom: 
one form that deals with transpolitical universal truths (Logos) and another that 
deals with the practical and imperfect realm of human affairs (a combination of 
Logos, mythos, ethos, pathos, and praxis). Generally speaking, philosophers tend to 
be more concerned with the former realm, while rhetoricians tend to be concerned 
with the latter realm: the public stage of human action where equally compelling if 
not equally influential or virtuous characterizations compete for allegiance in the 
formation of identity and community.
Phronesis and the Role of Rhetoric and Dialectic
Rhetoric, as a term, is oftentimes confusing because it can be conceptualized 
in a wide variety of ways: as a product (persuasive public speech), a process (the 
ongoing transformation of identities through discourse), and a critical practice (a 
critical analysis of identification practices and the systems of governance that result 
from those practices). Rhetoric can also be thought of as a tool (e.g. marketing), as 
a means of strengthening the values of a community (e.g. epideictic discourse), or 
as a menace to society (e.g. deceptive language used to obscure the truth or protect 
dishonorable interests). Defined narrowly, rhetoric is concerned with persuasive 
public discourse, while more widely it is concerned with all processes of identifica-
tion and identity formation. Within both definitions, however, we are in the realm 
of rhetoric if I can change or reinforce your characterization of your self, your 
community, or your government, for then we are in the realm of language in use, 
in the realm of the political (for good and ill), in the realm of the probable rather 
than the certain, and therefore in the realm of practical/political wisdom.23  Com-
plicating the fact that rhetoric can be defined in a wide variety of ways and can 
refer to a wide range of objects, university English departments teach rhetoric as 
composition while Speech Communication departments teach rhetoric as public 
speaking to first year students. While those familiar with the history of rhetoric 
may not be surprised at this diversity, it nonetheless can bewilder those looking to 
nail down what “rhetoric” is all about, let alone the relationship between rhetoric 
and political wisdom.
Despite public confusion about “rhetoric” (it is all of these things and more), 
it is crucial for a coherent articulation of postmodern political wisdom to under-
stand the significance of the term to philosophies of identity and contemporary 
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political theories. However, it is useful to start by once again returning to Aristotle, 
his foundational definition of rhetoric, and how he understood the relationship 
between rhetoric and phronesis. In Aristotle’s system of knowledge, rhetoric is an art 
(techne) that consists of observing the available means of persuasion, considering 
how they can be applied to achieve a civil state and virtuous citizens, then acting 
upon those considerations through phronesis.24  Phronesis is neither an art nor a 
science because it cannot guarantee its object (human good) by logical deduction 
or rational method alone. Instead, phronesis is the virtue, if not the foundation of 
all virtues, of political actors attempting to take right action in the realm of the 
probable through good character.25
To properly position phronesis and rhetoric within Aristotle’s theory of knowl-
edge, it is also important to understand how his five “means of judgment” deal 
with different objects of knowledge. In a passage of great import for political scien-
tists, Aristotle argues that “we must not look for the same degree of accuracy in all 
subjects; we must be content in each class of subjects with accuracy of such a kind 
as the subject matter allows, and to such an extent as is proper to the inquiry.”26 
Knowledge, therefore, should properly be divided into two classes: the scientific 
(rational) and the deliberative (reasonable).27   The former class deals with invariable 
principles and the relative certainties of math, the physical sciences, the productive 
arts, and theoretical wisdom, while the latter deals with variable principles and the 
relative uncertainties of political actions situated in time. Hence the unique role of 
rhetoric, for as the rhetorical theorist Barbara Warnick points out:
Because phronesis can be applied only in the particular case and because 
human affairs are intrinsically changeable and contingent, the standards for 
right action must be relative and applied to the case at hand rather than invari-
ant and universal. In determining such standards and the effects of action, 
rhetoric plays a vital role. It deals in probabilities and considers regularities 
across situations. Since such regularities and the general convictions regarding 
them can be known, rhetoric possesses a kind of knowledge, but it is qualita-
tively different from that possessed by episteme or sophia.28 
While we may ultimately discover that the standards for right action in the 
political realm have both universal (rational) and probable (reasonable) dimen-
sions, it is nevertheless the kind of deliberative knowledge produced by rhetoric 
that is of special importance for the articulation of a postmodern understanding 
of phronesis as political wisdom.
Aristotle argued that there were two categories of persuasive arts related to 
practical wisdom: rhetoric and dialectic.29  Both operate in the realm of the prob-
able and are applied only to subjects that admit of more than one outcome. 
Dialectic, a counterpart of rhetoric, is interactive dialogue with (usually small) 
groups of interlocutors capable of following extended logical arguments where 
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the purpose is to discern true and false reasoning.30  Dialectic could be viewed as 
dialogue between experts within a technical field of expertise, but in a broader 
and arguably more important sense as open and critical dialogue on deliberative 
issues by experts in argumentation guided by mutual good will seeking a common 
good. However, such “ideal speech conditions” are hardly the norm.31   Rhetoric, 
therefore, as opposed to dialectic, is the art of persuasion applied to (usually large) 
groups who are either incapable of following complex reasoning or who lack the 
motives, good will, skills, or shared premises required for dialectics. In this sense, 
rhetoric is “anti-dialogic” inasmuch as its application assumes a certain lack of 
deliberative skill and good will in the audience (but of course is dialogic in the 
broader sense of discourse entering into and circulating within an ideational econ-
omy).32  With rhetoric, the persuader must understand and begin her work from 
the accepted opinions of audience members rather than claims already established 
through expert dialogue and wise deliberation. Assessing the prejudices, ideology, 
commonsense, etc., of the audience, therefore, is also of paramount importance to 
the practically, as opposed to the theoretically, wise. 
Assuming that conflict rather than cooperation, misunderstanding rather than 
understanding, and self-interest rather than community interests are the norm in 
the vast majority of human relations, rhetoric at its best, coupled with dialectic 
when possible, produces a kind of knowledge in the service of phronesis: higher 
quality arguments and wiser deliberation in the service of virtuous character, right 
action, and a well-ordered state in the realm of the probable.  But, as we now know, 
the criteria for “higher quality,” “wise,” “virtuous,” “right,” and “well-ordered” are 
incessantly subject to contestation, and “the good” in the political realm will be 
relative to the hegemonic characterizations that prevail at any given moment in 
time. Today, it is not so easy to assume, as Aristotle did, that rhetoric “is valuable 
because truth and justice are by nature more powerful than their opposites” and 
that “virtue” and “good character” can be easily determined. Social truth itself 
must be rhetorically negotiated in a way more radical than Aristotle may have 
supposed 
Practical Wisdom and Its Areas of Application
 It follows that, at least according to Aristotle, we should think of practical 
wisdom (here conceived as political wisdom) as the wise use of the persuasive rhe-
torical arts to most probably construct virtuous character and good government. 
It is both a form of criticism (unmasking presumed certainty in the deliberative 
realm) and a form of praxis (contributing to wise/r deliberation for the sake of the 
common good).33  Wisdom in the political realm is a practice of dealing not only 
with people usually incapable of extended dialogue on complex matters (both 
within and between disciplinary practices), but with people who are self-inter-
ested, who are constrained by various familial roles, who are employed by self-
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interested organizations, who are “represented” in various fashions, and who are 
“condemned to choose” from the possibilities provided by the broader material 
and ideational economies in which they find themselves.  
As a result of the multi-layered form of the realm of political wisdom (personal 
identities, disciplinary identities, collective identities, state identities), it is argu-
able that political wisdom, to be effective in all of the political areas in which the 
persuasive arts prevail, needs to be applied to the realm of individual action within 
ideational/material economies (the art of the self ), to the realms of disciplinary 
identity and collective identity construction (the arts of professional and public 
character), and to the realm of institutional design (the art of statecraft). In the 
realm of individual action, the individual is “separated” from his “natural” condi-
tions through language and the consequences of language.34  There are no promises 
whatsoever that reason, let alone rationality, will prevail. Maneuvering within the 
maze of assigned and achieved roles and the disciplinary practices in which those 
roles are embedded is one key area that must be incessantly tackled by the politi-
cally wise. 
In addition to our personal ethics, and in light of the warnings about moral 
certainty in postmodernity, it is also important for the politically wise to recognize 
the importance of professional and public character. Familial roles, professional 
roles, “ethnic” roles, class roles, gender roles, citizen roles, each have a personal and 
a public dimension: personal in that individuals experience subjection to them 
and, sometimes, empowerment by them, and public in that they are negotiated 
through discourse and inter-subjectively enforced. In an age of competitive states 
that purport to represent the interests of “nations” and historically distinct “peo-
ples,” the persuasive arts are also central to the problem of state identity construc-
tion.35  The eminent social historian Erich Kahler noted almost half a century ago 
that the history of the world, in many respects, is the history of the character of 
communities.36 International relations theorists more recently are equally adamant 
in their insistence that transformations in discourse result in transformations in 
the nation-state system and vice versa.37   Each of these areas applies to the realm of 
political wisdom in post-modernity.
In addition to being “subject” to personal and collective identities, individu-
als are also caught up in institutional structures that have ossified over the years 
because of certain kinds of agreements made by individuals in the past.  Political 
wisdom, therefore, relates not only to concrete human action within matrices of 
disciplinary practices and the fabrication and political consequences of private and 
public character, it is also concerned with argumentation processes within and 
across disciplines and how different forms of consensus and identification lead 
to different kinds of institutions and governments. Therefore the final key areas 
of incessant concern to the politically wise would be public deliberative processes 
and statecraft. 
These three dimensions of political wisdom (the rhetorical self, the rhetorical 
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community, and the rhetorical state), would require the phronimos, at the very 
least, to understand from the outset that shared premises and good will are not to 
be expected in the political realm, that the deliberative arts of rhetoric and dialec-
tic must be brought to bear on the particulars of the political moment, that any 
conception of the “common good” will necessarily lead to political exclusions with 
material consequences, and that it is crucial to have the capacity to distinguish 
“rational” arguments from reasonable arguments. Additionally, it is useful for the 
phronimos to have an understanding of the history of governments (i.e. the trans-
formation of states from tribe to monarchy to nation-state to transnationalism), 
the evolution of constitutionalism, and consequent developments in civil society 
to understand the shifting relationships among collective identities and forms of 
state.  
In sum, the political actor who claims to be politically wise realizes first and 
foremost the utter absence of certainty in the political realm; this is her wisdom. 
The phronimos does not expect “rationality” to prevail, does not expect dialogue 
(although institutional systems can be created that maximize the possibility that 
pseudo-certainties are maximally problematized), does not expect good will, does 
not expect shared premises, but does expect conflict, exclusion, faction, violence, 
self-interest, ethical shallowness and deceit.  However, this is not a cynical but a 
practical wisdom based on the expectation that because identification happens 
as it does, the politically wise must interact with identification processes accord-
ingly within the “systems of governmentality” that prevail. There is an obvious 
series of unavoidable paradoxes here. First, there is the paradox of agency. On the 
one hand, intentionality has been problematized by postmodern thought, forcing 
us to consider how we are “thrown” into identities and situations. On the other 
hand, it is arguable that postmodernism is actually an extension of the ongoing 
Enlightenment project of self-awareness and freedom from unrecognized authori-
ties. Therefore, the postmodern rhetorical phronimos is simultaneously a willful 
agent and a constrained subject. Second, there is the paradox of forging common 
ground and establishing a common good.  Clearly, the politically wise person, in 
her knowledge of the processes of identity formation, nonetheless must seek not 
only to act upon a notion of the common good and help to create a shared vision 
of the common good, but simultaneously must recognize that any attempt to 
do so entails exclusionary and marginalizing consequences. Therefore, part and 
parcel of the conception of the common good, the politically wise person must 
incorporate an incessant reflexive appreciation of limits and a willingness to allow 
transgressions to illuminate and modify those limits. Third, there is the paradox 
of action itself.  Any decision is a limiting form of closure that does a necessary 
“violence” to alternative possibilities.  However, since action in the political realm 
is unavoidable (actions must be taken to resolve issues characterized as needing 
attention given the constructed conception of the common good), this dimension 
of violence is unavoidable. The key, for the postmodern phronimos, is to so con-
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struct articulations of the common good and the personal, familial, professional, 
and collective institutions that support them, to minimize that violence. While 
enumerating the conditions for the possibility of such a state of affairs constitutes a 
certain idealism, the entire project is necessarily shot through with paradox (since 
any articulation of necessary conditions constitutes the “violent,” even if tempo-
rary, imposition of ideational and institutional limits).
Such a characterization of contemporary political wisdom compares in inter-
esting ways with current debates between philosophers and political theorists, 
particularly the debates between philosophical hermeneuts such as Gadamer, 
deconstructionists such as Derrida, and “rational” and “critical” political theorists. 
A review of these debates, I maintain, supports the characterization just provided 
of the politically wise person as a postmodern rhetorical phronimos.
Dialogue versus Deconstruction 
Contemporary political theorists are centrally concerned today about how 
identification happens as it does, and they are generally well aware of recent 
developments in identity philosophy. It is not surprising, then, that many of 
their debates revolve around questions raised by the identity logics that follow 
from contemporary philosophies of identity formation. These debates should 
be of particular interest to those concerned about the role of dialogue in fos-
tering more competent forms of political governance, particularly given the 
perspective of theorists who seek to multiply institutional and discursive sites 
of contestation, dissensus, and transgression rather than seek (or expect) unity, 
dialogue, and consensus.  Given that “rational” certainty is conceptualized as 
the enemy of political reason, the debates are directly relevant.
To briefly outline the issues that inform these recent debates in political 
theory, the relatively recent philosophical debate between Gadamer and Der-
rida is particularly useful.38   Some of the distinctions between these two think-
ers provide the setting for the more recent debate in political theory between 
Habermas and Chantal Mouffe. The debate between Gadamer and Derrida 
can be summarized as two different identity logics: Gadamer’s logic is based 
on philosophical hermeneutics and Derrida’s is based on critical linguistics. 
Put simply, Gadamer believes that dialogue, based upon good will, is the para-
digmatic instance of human communication. Derrida, conversely, maintains 
that all forms of consensus are based upon exclusions (all identity is based on 
absence and difference).  According to Derrida, dialogue is not the paradig-
matic instance of human communication because Gadamer’s “good will” does 
not exist in the vast majority of communicative instances. Instead of seeking 
dialogue and consensus through good will, therefore, Derrida argues for a con-
ception of justice as an incessant personal and institutional vigilance to the 
exclusions necessarily created by identification processes.39   
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There is little doubt that Gadamer has thoroughly explained how interpreta-
tion (hence meaning making) is an incessant process whereby the horizon of 
the Self fuses with the horizon of the Other (thus he definitely contributes to 
the general thrust of contemporary identity philosophy and the de-centering of 
the intentional subject). In his famous Truth and Method, he discusses in depth 
how meaning making and identification is a “fusion of horizons” when the 
image, characterization, or sign/symbol (with the meaning ostensibly offered 
by it) “fuses” with the individual’s own apprehension of it through their unique 
ideational and experiential horizon. A child from a ghetto, for example, would 
likely interpret a pastoral scene of a child playing in an expansive field before a 
farmhouse in a much different way than would a child from a farm. The message 
is the same; the interpretation is different. However, Gadamer’s further insis-
tence on the primacy of “good will” as a prerequisite for communication and 
his belief that the paradigmatic instance of human communication is dialogue, 
at least in his philosophical debate with Derrida, drifts too far away from the 
teachings of continental philosophy of the Nietzschean-Saussurian-Foucauld-
ian variety.40  According to these latter thinkers, identity requires difference, 
freedom requires constraint, and disciplinary practices, language games, profes-
sions, collective identities, and institutional settings all impose certain capacity-
generating limits. In the general clash of these discursive-material practices, we 
find ourselves situated in economies from which there is no escape and in which 
we find ourselves incessant transgressors. Since capacity-generating disciplin-
ary systems (technes), each designed for a particular object, punish those who 
transgress their rules, and since rules change from system to system and “right 
action” in one is “wrong action” in another, instead of dialogue motivated by 
good will as the paradigmatic instance of human communication we actually 
have Hobbes’ war of all against all.   
Indeed, one would be hard pressed to seriously maintain that the history 
of the world has been a history of dialogue or that the normal communication 
situation in the political realm is not saturated with power, unless one were 
prepared to argue that violence, or at least transgression, is a form of dialogue 
(or at least communication). And one might not be equally hard pressed to say 
that violence certainly “sends a message.” Militaries have been used through-
out history, as have their weapons, to send messages (“let’s drop the bomb!”). 
Institutional constraints also send messages. If a college student enters a class-
room late or turns in a late paper he may be punished with a lower grade. If a 
doctor fails to properly diagnose a condition she can be sued for malpractice. 
If a husband fails to adequately communicate with his spouse he may end up 
divorced. If a soldier refuses to obey an order and “defend his nation” he will 
either be imprisoned or executed. There are “familial” language games, gender 
games, professional games, citizenship games, legal games, etc., in which we all 
find ourselves variously embedded, and whenever we wittingly or unwittingly 
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“break the rules” we immediately find out about those rules. Our transgressions 
reveal the limits, and since limits should be available for critical reflection trans-
gression and conflict arguably serve positive political purposes.41
So, at least according to Gadamer’s critics, violence sends a message as do 
the constraints imposed by social institutions, and the general mode of social 
interaction is based on conflict, not dialogue. For the individual subject, life 
unfolds on an ultimately “undecidable” terrain. Freedom, therefore, is not some 
magical extraction from the fabric of these texts, but is the ability to recog-
nize and react to the constraints imposed by characterizations, institutions, and 
communities, and that ability can only be nurtured through acts of transgres-
sion and subversion coupled with a mastery of the persuasive arts.  Paradoxi-
cally, the more transgression there is the more freedom there is, under certain 
conditions, and those conditions are clarified when one examines the classical 
notion of practical wisdom in tandem with contemporary political theory of 
the Derridian variety.
The principal relevance of this debate to postmodern conceptions of politi-
cal wisdom is that Gadamer appears to put the cart before the horse.  Good 
will is not something to be presupposed in political communication; instead, 
it is the hoped for outcome.  The problems revolve around the articulation and 
institutionalization of the “common good” in ways that encourage transgres-
sion and dissensus.  Arguably, Derrida’s notion of  “deconstructive justice” and 
Judith Butler’s discussion of the incessant problem of the relationship between 
the particular and the universal are good places to begin.  Admitting the logi-
cal tension between any kind of willed action and postmodern attention to the 
constraining systems in which we are hopelessly enmeshed, Derrida’s notion of 
deconstructive justice suggests a logic that seeks articulations of identity and 
the institutions that support them in ways that maximize self-critique.  Judith 
Butler’s philosophical position on the construction of concepts of the “common 
good” resonates with Derrida’s.42  Butler concurs that the problem with all uni-
versalizing discourses (such as those that might seek to articulate a “common” 
good) is that they necessarily marginalize; therefore, it is only reasonable to 
construct identification practices and institutions in ways that maximize the 
incessant realization of that fact.  Only through such a procedure can the pos-
sibility for good will be maximized, and this, then, is the “ethical norm” sug-
gested by postmodernism.
Critical Political Theory and the Rhetorical Phronimos
As already noted, debates among contemporary political theorists in many 
ways mirror the debate between Gadamer and Derrida. Should theory work to 
build a “rational” consensus based on deliberative norms and procedural practices 
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that will mitigate against the problems associated with identity construction and 
maximize the possibility for wise deliberation and dialogue (e.g. Habermas), or 
should theory help to diversify sites of contestation and transgression given that 
consensus within the political realm tends toward tyranny (e.g. Mouffe)?  Politi-
cal theorists such as Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau, and identity theorists (broadly 
conceived) ranging from Nietzsche to Slavoj Žižek, maintain that subversion is at 
the heart of constitution, absence and difference are at the heart of identity, and 
that the abstract and complex processes of identification in which we participate 
have direct and profound impacts on our sense of self, the way others read us, and 
our forms of community.43  This “identity logic” leads to the conclusion that any 
consensus does a certain violence, creates an Other.  Whenever we have absolute 
closure in our characterizations a “not what it is” or “not who we are” is being cre-
ated, and constraining sets of institutional limits are imposed. To reveal the limit, 
therefore, not to achieve consensus, at least according to these theorists, should be 
the watchwords of any contemporary understanding of political wisdom.
But here again a return to Aristotle’s notion of phronesis is useful, for we dis-
cover that if Descartes had read his Aristotle more carefully, if he read Aristotle at 
all, he might have saved social philosophy over two centuries of grief. The central 
question among many political theorists today remains whether or not universal 
rules can be determined to maximize the human good, or, for others, to what 
degree theoretical wisdom and practical wisdom can intertwine. Aristotle made 
it clear that timing, appropriateness, and a lack of certainty were part of practical 
wisdom; therefore, the certainty of the arts and sciences was not possible in the 
political world. And yet here do we not already have theoretical principles applied 
to the world of particulars (i.e. that timing, appropriateness, and a lack of certainty 
are universal dimensions of practical wisdom)?  Perhaps there are other dimensions 
of theoretical wisdom that apply to the rhetorical phronimos.
As we have seen, Aristotle noted that phronesis operates in four realms: the realm 
of self-interest, the family realm, the institutional realm, and the realm of govern-
ment.  Furthermore, through his discussions of government and his familiarity 
with the wide variety of constitutions and governments in his own time, he further 
embodied the qualities of a phronimos in ways that can be applied to our own age. 
For example, it is a curious thing that the contemporary world defends democ-
racy at all, for if we read Aristotle’s Politics carefully the best government possible 
when “the many” govern is not democracy but polity.44   As is well known, Aris-
totle claimed that kingships, aristocracies, and polities are good regimes because 
in each the government was primarily concerned with the common advantage. 
When these healthy forms of government decay, they tend to fall into tyrannies, 
oligarchies, or democracies. Tyranny occurs when an individual uses government 
to their personal advantage at the expense of the people. An oligarchy is when 
“those with property” hold power at the expense of the people, and a democracy 
is when the poor use government to the disadvantage of the propertied classes or 
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when there is a tyranny of the majority. 
So how can we combine Aristotle’s notion of phronesis and his theory of gov-
ernment with critical political theories seeking to multiply sites of political con-
testation and institutionalized transgression?  How might the world today look to 
Aristotle?  Initially, it seems likely, given his obvious concern for probable knowl-
edge and the arts associated with persuasion, that he would not take issue with the 
renewed interest in symbolic persuasion as the basis for personal and collective 
identity construction. Given his belief that polities were potentially problematic 
because “where more are concerned it is difficult for them to be proficient with a 
view to virtue as a whole,”45  and given his belief that “self-interest” was the norm, 
not the exception, in the political realm, it is also reasonable to assume that he 
might side with Derrida. 
And how might today’s hegemonic form of government and our general polit-
ical conditions appear to Aristotle within his four realms of practical wisdom? 
Today, might he not likely note that we are under a global corporate oligarchy 
and far from global polity, although every state prefers to call themselves a democ-
racy?46   The dominant ideology (or the dominant unquestioned philosophy of 
political economy) he would likely note is market ethics combined with liberal 
democracy.  Being an expert on comparative governments, he would undoubtedly 
recognize that the present neo-liberal world philosophy is based on the belief that 
when interests are set against interests (i.e. when markets are created) then political 
freedoms will naturally follow.47   Representative of this point of view is F.A. Hayek, 
who claimed that “competition . . . is the only method by which our activities can 
be adjusted to each other without coercive or arbitrary intervention of authority. 
Indeed, one of the main arguments in favor of competition is that it dispenses with 
the need for ‘conscious social control.’”48   
Aristotle would undoubtedly lament such a conclusion, given that there is no 
such thing as government without social control. He would not be so naïve as 
to believe that unrestrained self-interest alone could provide a sufficient basis for 
practical wisdom (Kant certainly understood this as well). As Aristotle noted in 
his Ethics, “[T]he end of political science is the supreme good; and political sci-
ence is concerned with nothing so much as with producing a certain character in 
the citizens or in other words with making them good, and capable of performing 
noble actions.”49   So practical wisdom must be centrally concerned with virtuous 
character, but can that character be confined to self-interest?  No. According to 
Aristotle, “One species of knowledge then is the knowledge of one’s own interests 
. . . yet it is perhaps impossible for a person to seek his own good successfully 
without domestic economy or statesmanship.”50   This is not to say that we can 
simply transplant Aristotle into our current context, but to suggest ways in which 
his theory of practical wisdom might be appropriately modified to become a more 
contemporary conception of political wisdom.  
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Identity Construction and Political Wisdom
Here is an initial attempt at outlining of a postmodern form of political wisdom. 
First, our notions of virtuous character must derive from our theoretical wisdom 
concerning identity construction and the political realm. The identity logic of 
Nietzsche, Foucault, and Derrida is persuasive, and it has now been effectively 
argued that identification processes necessarily constrain and only potentially 
enable. The phronimos must be practical and not expect rationality in the political 
realm, and the “art of the self ” must be based on an eternal vigilance about the 
limits necessarily imposed by processes of identification. Second, in contemporary 
“market democracies” civic virtue is rarely a concern of institutional actors and 
oftentimes public deliberation occurs between corporate, government, and non-
government actors representing competing interests and having different premises 
who compromise through a process of confrontation and transgression.  Here we 
have a world of professions and sciences without phronesis. Within such a politi-
cal milieu, whose ultimate logic is one of self-interest, the individual is subject to 
all of the constraints imposed by the available roles within those fundamentally 
dramatic and political situations (political in the sense that power is at work within 
the drama and the “wrong move,” quite separate from any notions of “virtuous 
character,” can have very concrete negative consequences - e.g. loss of job, excom-
munication, etc.).  We have to be practical: in the human realm of political action 
any abstract notion of virtuous character and right action must be tempered by 
the constraints imposed by the particular discursive/institutional regime imposed 
on the actor at the time.
Third, the politically wise individual would also be concerned about any threats 
to political pluralism on both the local, national, and international levels. The rise 
of multinational corporations and multinational government organizations are at 
the forefront, for example, of a general trend that is transforming the landscape 
of government and replacing deliberative democracy with executive democracy. 
Organizations such as the World Trade Organization now have non-elected judges 
and unrepresentative internal court systems that adjudicate between competing 
states when conflicts arise.51   When the WTO court renders a judgment against 
a particular country then that country must either change their policies or suffer 
economic and political consequences.  To join the WTO, or to receive financial 
assistance from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, or interna-
tional development banks, countries must oftentimes agree to “structural adjust-
ments.” These structural adjustments are guided by very clear meta-institutional 
characterizations guided by the market logic of corporate self-interest. New forms 
of supra-national governance are beginning to emerge, what some have variously 
referred to as global constitutionalism or cosmopolitan citizenship, and the char-
acterizations that presently govern those forms of governance are not following 
the dictates of political wisdom, nor the warning of political theorists throughout 
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the ages. Those in charge of these policies have clearly not read their Kant!  If 
anything, we are moving away from managed antagonism and toward neo-liberal 
monologue, and the contemporary phronimos must be not only be concerned with 
such developments but act, within the logic of incessant identity critique, upon 
those concerns. 
Arguably, then, there are profound connections between processes of identi-
fication, rhetorical praxis, and community building. Characterizations are pro-
vided through arguments and narratives that present the world in a particular way, 
and individuals act within and upon their world according to the particular way 
in which they experience and act upon those characterizations. The only way to 
intervene in such a world is through the persuasive arts. Clearly, different char-
acterizations and different interpretations of characterizations are the stuff of the 
world of human meaning.  Clearly, different material conditions compel individu-
als to focus on different characterizations that tend to best express the truth of 
their condition (whether consciously or not).  Clearly, different kinds of political 
institutions and different sets of expectations by individuals within those institu-
tions directly impact the material conditions in which people live.  Characteriza-
tions, institutions, and communities are all intimately woven together to form the 
general economy of our world.
Our day-to-day interactions with people, with institutions, and with state sys-
tems are thoroughly rhetorical.  We may try to “stay out of politics,” but really 
that is hardly possible.  Every characterization and every choice that we make fol-
lows from a rhetorical realism. At bottom, then, the politically wise person, like 
Socrates, must recognize that they are not wise, but are surrounded by people who 
think they are wise. Indeed, they may be technically wise, or artfully wise, but few 
are able to artfully and virtuously negotiate among the self-interested.  And what, 
then, does it mean to negotiate virtuously?  On the one hand it means not to 
impose an essentialist identity on the Other, but on the other hand to expect to be 
essentialized by others. It also means to attempt to create institutional infrastruc-
tures that recognize and respond to the universal principles inherent in the process 
of identification. The question of social intervention, then, becomes the degree to 
which one will tolerate that lack of wisdom in others, the failures of our current 
political institutions, and the price they are willing to pay for pointing it out. 
In our contemporary world, with its various mass media sending out transver-
sal messages in unprecedented volumes, the politically wise also have to consider 
the consequences of “nation building” and corporate “global constitutionalism” for 
this constitutes our present and our future.  The politically wise will understand 
the political consequences of these fictions and will intervene, according to their 
bravery, to ensure those fictions are productive ones whose supporting institutions 
recognize the permanent dangers residing in the capacity/constraint dynamic with 
all identification processes.  
Within such a framework good will, empathy, and openness to the Other are 
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not considered the norm, but, as Mouffe has pointed out, “social relations and 
identities are always constructed through asymmetrical forms of power.”52   But 
perhaps, in the practically wise performance, Rhetoric and Dialectic, aware of 
certain blindnesses in the confidences of Governance, aid the fair Phronesis (whose 
virtuous character and wise deliberative process maximally guarantees peace and 
justice in the state and virtue among the citizens) in artfully persuading rash Gov-
ernance (who never leaves the stage) to right action.  
If the political is conceived as a realm in which self-interested individuals/
groups “manage” ideational and material economies so as to maximize power for 
themselves or their group (and that group is not universal), then there is no hope 
for wise politics.  If executive power is incessantly checked by representative power, 
if global economic and political power is maximally checked by local economic 
and political power, and if the political is conceived as a realm in which communi-
cation, law, economic policy, and military policy are coordinated to institutional-
ize principles of universal justice and maximally problematize assumed certainties, 
then there is hope.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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